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INTRODUCTION 
Article 39.3 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement)1 requires that all 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)2 take measures to 
protect the confidential test data submitted by originator 
pharmaceutical companies as a part of their bid to attain regulatory 
approval for New Chemical Entities (NCEs).3 Specifically, members 
must protect this data against “disclosure” and “unfair commercial 
use.”4 Essentially, this broad prescription in Article 39.3 gives WTO 
members the freedom to set their own rules by allowing them to 
interpret the Article’s principal terminology and, further, by permitting 
WTO members to choose the proper approach with which to implement 
this article. 
In practice, the permissive language of Article 39.3 permits a 
government to authorize a generic product on the basis of an earlier 
grant of regulatory approval for the originator product without running 
 
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS−RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 
1197  [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
2 The World Trade Organization is an organization that facilitates trade relationships 
between nations, as well as a forum in which governments can negotiate trade agreements. 
Operating under a system of global trade rules, the WTO functions as a place for 
governments to resolve trade problems and settle trade-related disputes. See generally What 
is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/index.htm (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2014). 
3 The ICTSD defines the relevant test data as: 
The subject matter of the protection under this Article is undisclosed information 
contained in written material which details the results of scientific health and safety 
testing of drugs and agrochemicals, in relation to human, animal and plant health, 
impact on the environment and efficacy of use. This information is not “invented” or 
“created” but developed according to standard protocols. The protected data may also 
include manufacturing, conservation and packaging methods and conditions, to the 
extent that their submission is needed to obtain marketing approval. 
Chapter 28: Undisclosed Information in RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 
at 530, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD) 
(Nov. 30, 2004); See also infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
4 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
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afoul of the Article’s prohibition on disclosing test data submitted by 
the originator company. However, this freedom enjoyed by some 
countries has been restricted for others, because of what are known as 
TRIPs-plus provisions. Found in bilateral and Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), TRIPs-plus provisions introduce greater intellectual property 
protection, a result accomplished by obliging the agreement’s 
signatories to provide an exclusivity period for the test data submitted 
by the originator company.5 This new protection regime is known as 
data exclusivity,6 and its heightened intellectual property protections, 
those beyond the mandate of Article 39.3, have been justified by both 
an incentive rationale and considerations of fairness.7 
Despite these purported benefits, however, the data exclusivity 
approach has had a negative effect on developing countries. For the 
reasons outlined herein, it is thus unfortunate that Jordan, as part of its 
accession to the WTO, has adopted both a five-year data exclusivity 
clause for NCEs in its “Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law,”8 
as well as a three-year data exclusivity clause for new uses of known 
NCEs as a part of the US-Jordan FTA.9 
 
5 Carsten Fink & Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property 
Provisions of Recent U.S. Free Trade Agreements at 2, WORLD BANK TRADE NOTE (Feb. 
7, 2005) (under these TRIPs-Plus  agreements, “[o]nce a company has submitted original 
test data, no competing manufacturer is allowed to rely on these data for a period of five 
years to request marketing approval for its own drug.”), http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/WBI-Training/288464-1119888387789/trade_note_Feb7 
_05.pdf. 
6 Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International 
Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 1, 65−68 (2009) [hereinafter Reichman, Rethinking]. 
7 See RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT supra note 3, at 532 (noting that 
it would be unequitable to deny protection to the investment made by originator companies 
and that, beyond this, would discourage other companies from making similar investments), 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs /RB_2.28_update.pdf. However, some have 
questioned the validity of these rationales. See Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, 
TRIPS, Bilateralism, Multilateralism & Implications for Developing Countries: Jordan’s 
Drug Sector, 2 MANCHESTER J. INT’L. ECON. L. 59 (2005) (“To start with, TRIPS will only 
benefit firms and countries that are at the frontline of technology.”), http://www.bilaterals 
.org/?trips-bilateralism-multilateralism. 
8 Law No. 15 of 2000 on Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
JORDAN, NO. 4423 (Apr. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Unfair Competition Law], http://www.wipo 
.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/jo/jo013en.pdf. 
9 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 
(2002), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Jordan%20FTA.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan 
FTA]. 
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First, this negative impact of the data exclusivity approach in 
developing countries means that the entry of cheap generic product has 
been delayed, even under compulsory license, which will have the 
injurious effect of limiting access to affordable medicines in 
developing countries.10 Since the implementation of pharmaceutical 
data exclusivity in 2001, the prices of medicines have increased 20%, 
a direct result of data exclusivity’s requirement that generic medicine 
cannot enter the market until the end of the prescribed five-year period 
following the approval of the originator’s product. This price increase 
caused by delay of generic products’ market entry has also increased 
the governmental bill for medicines.11 
Furthermore, data exclusivity’s constraints on the timely availability 
of generic medicines has adversely affected the pharmaceutical 
industry in Jordan in several ways, an outcome of particular importance 
since pharmaceuticals is the second largest export industry after 
garment manufacturing in Jordan.12 First, delaying generic medicine 
registration in Jordan, which is considered the country of origin, will 
then delay its exportation worldwide.13 Second, applying stricter 
intellectual property provisions has not resulted in local industry 
developing NCEs or new delivery systems, as the cost would exceed 
local industry financial resources. 
Moreover, though the United States assured Jordan that the US-
Jordan FTA would benefit Jordan in various ways, in particular by 
 
10 Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Geochemical 
Products Under Free Trade Agreements, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Moving the Pro-
development IP Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health, Education and 
Learning, Bellagio, Nov. 29–Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/event 
/2008/12/report31.pdf [hereinafter Correa, Protecting Test Data]. 
11 See generally Chapter 17: Patents-Subject Matter and Patentability Requirements in 
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT at 364, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD) (Nov. 29, 2004) (describing how 
“introduction of patents will normally lead to prices higher than those that would have 
prevailed in the absence of protection”), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research 
/2008/06/rb_217-226_patents_update.pdf. 
12 Jordan Pharmaceutical Sector at 1, GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE (June 2007), 
http://www.globalinv.net/research/Jordan-Pharmaceutical-Sector-062007.pdf. 
13 See, e.g., Neil McAuslane et al., A Cross-Regional Comparison of the Regulatory 
Environment in Emerging Markets at 5, CENTER FOR INNOVATION IN REGULATORY 
SCIENCE (Feb. 2006) (“A major factor in the timely access of new medicines to patients is 
the time taken by national regulatory authorities for the review and approval of 
applications.”), http://cirsci.org/sites/default/files/RD%2050%20Feb06%20EM%20Cross 
%20Regional%20Compar.pdf.gm. 
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increasing foreign direct investment within the country,14 this 
prediction did not prove accurate. Since 2001, no originator companies 
have made the kind of foreign direct investments envisioned by the 
US.15 Instead, the only case found was contract manufacturing with 
local industry, as secondary packaging without any transfer of product 
know-how. The reason for this was to obtain a higher public price for 
the originator product, based on considering Jordan as the country of 
origin, while in Egypt we can see that almost all originator companies 
have local manufacturing sites.16 
I 
DATA EXCLUSIVITY LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In this Part, we will discuss drug approval regulations for New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs), in particular the regulatory requirement that 
originator companies provide proof of a drug’s safety, efficacy and 
quality. We will then discuss the incorporation of test data protection 
in regional and international agreements and elaborate on the 
interpretation of Article 39.3 in the context of TRIPs Agreement 
obligations and conditions. Finally, we will discuss the incorporation 
of data exclusivity in Jordan’s Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets 
Law. 
A. Drug Regulation and Approval 
Before marketing, a drug should first be approved by the national or 
regional drug regulatory authority in order to prove its safety, efficacy 
and quality; this applies to both originator drug products and generic 
 
14 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: U.S.-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (May 1, 2001) 
(concluding that investigations undertaken by the U.S. government strongly support the 
possibility that “the FTA could substantially increase foreign direct investment in Jordan, 
both from the United States and from the rest of the world.”), http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD 
/USA_JOR/Studies/CRS_E.pdf. 
15 See generally Yusuf Mansur, Overcoming Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in 
Jordan, INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF OMAN AND THE FRASER INSTITUTE 
OF CANADA (June 2008), http://www.freetheworld.com/arab/Overcoming-Barriers 
_Foreign-Direct-Investment.pdf. 
16 Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPs-Plus Intellectual Property Rules in 
the U.S.-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines, 102 Oxfam Briefing Paper 5 (2007), 
[hereinafter Malpani], https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20 
no%20benefits.pdf. 
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drug products.17 Though this review process may vary by country, they 
all share a common dependency on the drug regulatory authority in 
order to have a reliable health system.18 For example, some countries 
require substantive review of the submitted data while others rely on 
the approval of a foreign drug regulatory authority.19 Usually, when the 
originator company discovers a NCE, it applies for a patent and during 
the proceeding patent examination and granting stage, the originator 
company develops “test data.”20 These test data are important for health 
purposes, since they permit national authorities and users to evaluate 
the merits and risks of new drugs.21 They are also important for 
commercial purposes, as the availability of the test data is a condition 
for obtaining marketing approval of new products, modifications or 
new uses of existing products.22 
Preclinical research on new compounds is carried out in the 
company’s laboratory, using a wide variety of techniques. In the first 
step of preclinical research, promising compounds are tested on 
animals in order to elucidate and investigate effects that cannot 
currently be predicted from the computer and test tube studies.23 
Animal testing will demonstrate the compound’s safety and will prove 
it is not toxic at the effective dosing level.24 During this time, the 
originator drug company files the related patents and decides whether 
to continue investigating this molecule, a decision based on its cost, 
potential profits and the likelihood of regulatory approval.25 If the 
company decides to invest in the molecule, it should file it as an 
Investigational New Drug (IND) with the applicable drug regulatory 
authority in order to make sure that the molecule is safe, which will 
then allow the company to proceed to the next stage of the approval 
 
17 Andy Gray, Access to Medicines and Drug Regulation in Developing Countries: A 
Resource Guide for DFID, DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE 1 (Oct. 2004), 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18246en/s18246en.pdf. 
18 Id. 




23 Meir Perez Pugatch, Data Exclusivity: Implications for Developing Countries, 
COMMENT, 9 BRIDGES 21 (2005), http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/Data_Exclusivity 
_BRIDGES9-6-7-3.pdf [hereinafter Pugatch]. 
24 Brandon Powell, Silence Is Not the Best Medicine: Requiring Disclosure of Clinical 
Trial Data for Abandoned Drugs, 33 J. LEG. MED. 571, 575 (2012) [hereinafter Powell]. 
25 Id. 
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process—clinical testing on humans. Usually, the preclinical studies 
take around three to four years to complete.26 
Subsequently, various clinical assessments in humans, funded by the 
originator company, are carried out following strict guidelines. Before 
carrying out these trials, the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), which 
are independent committees, will review the trials and study their 
potential risk on humans. Additionally, the concerned drug regulatory 
authority will be responsible to supervise the trials. 
Clinical trials are divided into four phases to prove the safety and 
efficacy of a molecule.27 In phase I, a small group (between 20 and 100) 
of healthy volunteers receives dosages of the investigational drug for a 
short period of time. The primary purpose of this phase is to look for 
evidence of toxicity or unexpected undesirable reactions at certain 
dosages, and to study the bioavailability and pharmacokinetics of the 
NCE/drug applied to patients.28 If the molecule is proved to be safe at 
the required dosage, it will then proceed to phase II.29 
Phase II of clinical testing has a similar purpose to Phase I,30 but 
takes into consideration the therapeutic context. Phase II’s primary 
objective is to ascertain the effectiveness of the investigational drug.31 
The number of participants includes up to several hundred people who 
suffer from the disease under study.32 The effectiveness of the molecule 
will be studied against placebos or other known molecules under 
controlled, randomized and double-blind studies.33 If the molecule is 
found to be effective at this juncture, then Phase III testing will begin.34 
Phase III clinical trials are conducted on a large member of patients, 
often involving several hundred human subjects and lasting for 
extensive periods of time. As with Phase I and II, Phase III tests are 
designed to determine the efficacy of the investigational drug and to 
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account age and gender considerations, drug interactions and specific 
dosage for different indications.35  
While Phase III trials are underway, long-term animal toxicity 
studies are undertaken to determine the effects of prolonged exposure 
and the effects of the NCE on subsequent generations. The resulting 
test data is then compiled with all required regulatory data and is 
submitted to the drug regulatory authority. Following receipt of these 
materials, the drug regulatory authority will assess the New Drug 
Application (NDA) and will decide whether or not to grant the 
marketing authorization for the NCE. Generally, marketing approval is 
granted for a specific drug which is used for a specific therapy. 
Changing the composition of the drug, combining it with other drugs 
or administering it for a new therapeutic indication or group of patients 
(e.g., pediatric use) would require new trials and approval by a 
competent authority.36 The results of all these studies constitute the 
“test data.”37 
Following the granting of marketing authorization, the newly 
authorized medicine is studied in large numbers of patients in hospitals 
and clinics to further assess its clinical effectiveness. This stage is 
called Phase IV, or post-marketing study.38 Safety Assessment of 
Marketed Medicines (SAMM) studies are initiated after the medicine 
has been made available for doctors to prescribe and help to identify 
any unforeseen side effects. These studies may involve many thousands 
of patients.39 Physicians’ databases are also used to identify medicine 
safety issues and to explore the potential for new or better use of 
medicines, once the product is available for prescription.40 
With regard to costs, according to Grabowski, the accumulation and 
compilation of the data included in a pharmaceutical registration file is 
estimated at $467 million, a figure which is more than 60% of the total 
cost of pharmaceutical R&D.41 Dimasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 
estimate that the current average capitalized costs of developing a new 
drug are approximately $870 million.42 Recent estimates by the Tufts 
 
35 Id. 
36 Powell, supra note 24. 
37 Id. 




42 Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data Under the TRIPs Agreement 
and Its Progeny: A Broader Perspective, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Moving Pro-
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Center for the Study of Drug Development suggest that the fully 
capitalized cost to develop a new drug, including studies conducted 
after receiving regulatory approval, averages $897 million.43 All told, 
the development of a new drug will take between ten to fifteen years to 
complete.44 
It should be taken into consideration that the accuracy of this figure 
may be disputed at the margins. It necessarily includes the cumulatively 
high costs of clinical trials incurred for the many drugs that fail to be 
approved.45 Following development, a drug will be reviewed by the 
drug’s regulatory authority for marketing approval, during which time 
most of the drug’s patent protection duration will elapse. In an effort to 
recoup the cost of the clinical studies, the originator companies lobbied 
for a system known in the United States as “marketing exclusivity” and 
in Europe as “data exclusivity.”46 
Data exclusivity establishes a period of time (generally five to ten 
years for NCEs) during which generic firms cannot win marketing 
approval based on the test data submitted by the originator.47 This 
period of exclusivity may serve to keep generics off the market even in 
cases where there is no patent in place, or a compulsory license has 
been issued.48 
 
development IP Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health, Education and 
Learning, Bellagio, Nov. 29–Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio 
/docs/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf [hereinafter, Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data]. 
43 The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development is an independent, academic, 
nonprofit research group at Tufts University in Boston, Massachusetts. The Center develops 
strategic information to help drug developers, regulators, and policy makers to improve the 
quality and efficiency of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical development, review, and 
utilization. TUFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, http://csdd.tufts.edu 
/about (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
44 Pugatch, supra note 23, at 21−22. See also Henry Grabowski, Patents and New 
Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC 
POL’Y REV 7, 10 (2003) (Figure 1 Data is adjusted to 2003 R&D expenditures); Joseph A. 
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003). 
45 Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data, supra note 42, at 2−3. 
46 Mike Palmedo, Do Pharmaceutical Firms Invest More Heavily in Countries with Data 
Exclusivity? 21 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 38, 38−39 (2013). See also Mike Palmedo, The 
TRADE Act of 2008’s Provisions on Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, AMER. 
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In this system, the drug regulatory authority gives the originator a 
period of protection after its approval and does not rely on its clinical 
studies to approve other generics.49 This system does not depend on the 
patent status of the originator; instead, the drug regulatory authority 
automatically provides protection for the originator company’s test 
data after it has granted approval for that drug.50 The protection period 
differs from country to country. In Jordan, it is five years for NCEs, as 
is the case in the United States, while in Europe it is “8 years data 
exclusivity and 2 years marketing exclusivity + 1 year new use data 
exclusivity.”51 Applying this system in a country whose drug regulatory 
authority requires substantive review of the submitted data52 will 
prevent the generic product from relying on the originator’s data.53 In 
this case, the generic producer has two options: either to wait for the 
data exclusivity period to end, or generate its own clinical data. Neither 
option available to a generic producer is a good one. Waiting for the 
protection period to end will delay the entry of the generic product to 
the market,54 which will affect access to medicine with affordable 
prices, and repeating studies is considered unethical and lengthy. 
Furthermore, conducting its own trials is not a viable option for 
generic producers since doing so would exceed their financial 
capacity.55 The rising economic significance of data exclusivity is a 
combination of three factors: (1) the lengthy and costly process of 
clinical trials; (2) the ongoing innovative productivity challenges the 
pharmaceutical industry; and (3) the fierce legal patent disputes 
between research-based and generics-based pharmaceutical 
companies.56 In fact, data exclusivity is becoming increasingly 
dominant as an additional intellectual property layer of protection, 
which affects both research-based and generic-based companies.57 
B. Regional and International Agreements 
In 1992, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Article 1711, first introduced the protection of undisclosed 
 






55 Pugatch, supra note 23, at 21−22. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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information. This inclusion was based on the pharmaceutical product 
originators’ desire to protect clinical data that they could not protect 
under patent law because there is no inventive step. This measure 
advanced the interests of these companies since it would benefit them 
to keep the data secret in order to prevent competitors from capitalizing 
on the data derived from costly clinical studies. Therefore, it was 
included in TRIPs Article 39.3 to provide a separate type of protection 
of test data. 
1. NAFTA58 
The first agreement including “Data Exclusivity Protection” was the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This regional free 
trade agreement concluded by the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
granted a minimum of five-years data exclusivity for the originator 
drug company for submitting undisclosed test data.59 
Data exclusivity is incorporated in Article 1711.60 Section (5) of this 
article considers this test data as a “trade secret,” while section (6) 
determines the minimum protection period as five years, and section 
(7) discusses the case of the reliance of marketing approval on other 
authorities.61 
 
58 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993), https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trad       
-Agreement/ctl/SectionView/mid/1588/sid/b6e715c1-ec07-4c96-b18e-d762b2ebe511 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico (NAFTA) entered into force. All remaining 
duties and quantitative restrictions were eliminated, as scheduled, on January 1, 2008. North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade        
-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2014). 
59 NAFTA, supra note 58. 
60 NAFTA, supra note 58, art. 1711, alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=SectionView 
&mid=1588&sid=b6e715c1-ec07-4c96-b18e-d762b2ebe511&language=en-US#A1711. 
61 Article 1711 of  NAFTA states: 
(5) If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical 
or agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission 
of undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the use of such 
products is safe and effective, the Party shall protect against disclosure of the data of 
persons making such submissions, where the origination of such data involves 
considerable effort, except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or 
unless steps are taken to ensure that the data is protected against unfair commercial 
use. 
(6) Each Party shall provide that for data subject to paragraph (5) that are submitted 
to the Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person other than 
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These provisions outlined the scheme of data exclusivity as follows: 
1. Scope of coverage: Though this agreement did not define NCE 
clearly, it did determine that NCE was applicable in both 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical contexts. It was argued whether a 
drug should be considered an NCE in regards to any other product in 
any country or only in the same country. The commonly accepted 
definition was “a product previously approved in a foreign country will 
continue to be ‘new’ for that Party until it is registered there, even if 
this happens many years after its first marketing approval.”62 Also, this 
agreement did not require protection for new uses or new dosage 
forms.63 
2. Subject Matter and Conditions of Protection: The protection is 
only for “undisclosed information” that has not been published or 
disclosed in the public domain.64 Published test data will not be 
protected. Also, another condition is that the production of the test data 
at issue involved “considerable effort.”65 
3. Terms of Protection: A reasonable period of five years as a 
minimum should be provided from the date of marketing approval. This 
period can be extended by taking into consideration the nature of test 
data and the efforts involved for producing such data. In case of 
reliance on another country’s approval, the protection period will be 
 
the person that submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, rely on such 
data in support of an application for product approval during a reasonable period of 
time after their submission. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally 
mean not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval to 
the person that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account 
of the nature of the data and the person’s efforts and expenditures in producing them. 
Subject to this provision, there shall be no limitation on any Party to implement 
abbreviated approval procedures for such products on the basis of bioequivalence 
and bioavailability studies. 
(7) Where a Party relies on a marketing approval granted by another Party, the 
reasonable period of exclusive use of the data submitted in connection with obtaining 
the approval relied on shall begin with the date of the first marketing approval relied 
on. 
NAFTA, supra note 58, art. 1711. 
62 G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required 
by Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1,  2−6 (2003) [hereinafter 
Skillington & Solovy]. 
63 Id. 
64 Pei-kan Yang, Current Development of Canada’s Data Exclusivity Regime: How Does 
Canada React to NAFTA, TRIPs and Dangle Between Pharmaceutical Innovation and 
Public Health?, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 67−69 (2009) [hereinafter 
Yang]. 
65 Id. 
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the same as in the relied-upon country. This point was included to 
prevent the delay of originator product registration.66 
4. Nonreliance and Nondisclosure Obligations: The drug 
regulatory authority shall not rely on such test data until the end of the 
protection period. At that time, authorities may then register a generic 
product on the basis of it submitting a bioequivalence study.67 
Moreover, the authority should protect the test data from disclosure to 
a third person except where it is necessary to protect the public, or 
unless steps are taken to protect these test data against unfair 
commercial use.68 
5. Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement and Article 1711 of 
NAFTA: The two are similar in terms of their scope of coverage, 
subject matter, and conditions of protections. An important difference 
between the two agreements is that TRIPs did not specify an exclusive 
protection period for the submitted data,69 so each country is free to 
introduce the suitable approach for the protection of these undisclosed 
test data against “unfair commercial use,” except countries that signed 
bilateral agreements with the United States.70 Another difference is that 
the TRIPs Article 39.3 lacks a clear definition of “unfair commercial 
use,” and does not cement the link between “nonreliance” and data 
exclusivity. In other words, TRIPs does not determine whether reliance 
on such test data is to be considered as an “unfair commercial use.”71 
2. TRIPs Provisions on Data Exclusivity 
TRIPs provisions have extended the prohibition of unfair 
competition within the meaning of Article 10 bis of the Paris 
Convention to all WTO members. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
Article 10 bis in Article 39.1 of the TRIPs Agreement did not widen 
the boundaries of the obligation.72 
The intellectual property protection Article 39.3 provides is 
considered to be a reward for the investment pharmaceutical companies 







71 Yang, supra note 64. 
72 Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data, supra note 42, at 21−23. 
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companies to invest more in generating test data.73 The test data is 
developed through standard protocols and procedures, which explains 
why they cannot be protected through the patent system, as these 
processes lack the novelty condition requisite for protection under 
patent law.74 According to this article, test data protection is classified 
as a category of intellectual property but this inclusion in the TRIPs 
Agreement does not mean the granting of exclusive rights.75 
Article 39 of TRIPs76 outlines WTO members’ obligations against 
test data protection.77 Article 39.1 identifies undisclosed information to 
be submitted to regulatory authority to be protected from unfair 
competition as stated in Article 10bis of Paris Convention (1967).78 
 
73 See Reichman supra note 6. 
74 Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of 
Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69, 72-73 (2002) 
[hereinafter Correa, Unfair Competition]. 
75 Id. 
76 Article 39 of TRIPs states: 
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as 
provided in Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect 
undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to 
governments or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3. 
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information 
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to acquire by, or used by others 
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as 
such information: 
(a) Is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration 
and assembly 
of its components, generally known or readily accessible to persons within 
the circles 
that normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
(b) Has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) Has been subject to reasonable steps under circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in  
control of the information, to keep it secret. 
3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical 
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. 
In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use. 
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
77 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 2−6. 
78 Id. 
NSOUR (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2016  9:02 AM 
2016] Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: 273 
Was It the Best Choice for Jordan Under the 
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement? 
Article 39.2 clarifies the standards for this protection.79 Meanwhile, 
Article 39.3 specifies that undisclosed information regarding 
pharmaceutical and agricultural NCEs which is submitted to regulatory 
authorities must receive governmental protection against unfair 
commercial use under certain conditions.80 
Article 39.2 clarifies that certain conditions have to be met in order 
for the data to receive protected status. A party seeking protection for 
its product must submit “undisclosed test or other data” for a drug 
containing a “new chemical entity” of a pharmaceutical or agricultural 
product81 to a national drug regulatory authority. Additionally, 
generating the test data must have required “considerable effort” which 
was put forth in a bid to obtain marketing approval for the drug. If these 
conditions are met, then WTO members are obliged to protect the test 
data against unfair commercial use and, further, to avoid disclosing 
such data unless they have put in place a system designed to protect the 
data against unfair commercial use.82 Disclosure, however, is allowed 
in the case of the protection of public.83 After the TRIPs 
implementation, this article was subjected to different interpretation, as 
many of the terms used are not clearly defined. These terms are “unfair 
commercial use,” “new chemical entities,” “considerable effort,” and 
“necessary to protect the public.”84 The difference in interpreting these 
terms created different implementation approaches between 
developing and developed countries.85 
C. Interpretation and Controversies on Interpretation 
As noted earlier, the pliant language of Article 39.3 makes it 
susceptible to various interpretations. Essentially, the Article’s 
definitional silence concerning its key terminology allows WTO 
members the latitude to determine what “unfair commercial,” “new 
chemical entities,” “considerable effort,” and “necessary to protect the 




81 Shreya Matilal, Do Developing Countries Need a Pharmaceutical Data-exclusivity 
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defining the terms found in Article 39.3 in order to give member 
countries the freedom to implement the protection approach that they 
believe would be the most beneficial within their individual countries.86 
However, this interpretive freedom is not meant to be carte blanche, 
and any individual WTO member’s interpretation of Article 39.3 must 
still cohere with the general aim the drafters of the article sought to 
achieve with its passage. The most important element in interpreting 
Article 39.3 is to refer to the history of negotiation of this article and to 
employ Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties,87 which instructs that the object and purpose of the treaty must 
be carefully considered where necessary88 to determine the ordinary 
meaning of a particular word.89 
Recourse to these traditional methods of construction, however, has 
not fully resolved conflicting interpretations of the article’s provisions. 
In particular, there has been a debate between developed countries, who 
insist that the proper interpretation of the article includes data 
exclusivity requirements, and developing countries, who insist that 
Article 39.3 requirement that members cannot disclose the originator 
company’s test data to third parties does not prohibit a regulatory 
authority from relying on this test data when granting a generic product 
market approval.90 
Ultimately, Article 39.3 perhaps anticipated this debate, and its 
language reflects a compromise between the conflicting policy of 
access to affordable medicines and considerations of strong 
intellectual-property protection policy, and gave the boundaries for the 
protection of test data, and left its implementation for each member 
country to choose what benefits it best.91 
 
86 Id. 
87 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is a treaty concerning the 
international law on treaties between states. It was adopted on 22 May 1969, opened for 
signature on 23 May 1969. The Convention entered into force on 27 January1980. It applies 
only to treaties concluded between states, so it does not cover agreements between states 
and international organizations or between international organizations themselves. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) 
[hereinafter VCLT], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155 
/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf. 
88 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 84. 
89 Id. 
90 Matilal, supra note 81, at 271. 
91 Id. 
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1. Conditions of Protection 
a. Data Necessary for Marketing Approval 
“Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of . . .”92 
The first condition of this article is territorial: If the drug regulatory 
authority of the member country requires test data submission in order 
to get the approval of marketing of the pharmaceutical product, then it 
should protect this test data.93 
Generally, there are two competing interpretations of this sentence. 
On one side, Correa has concluded that if the drug regulatory authority 
does not require the submission of test data for approving a 
pharmaceutical product, then this article will not apply.94 Following 
from this, any test data voluntarily submitted or in excess of what is 
required to approve a pharmaceutical product in that country, would 
not be subjected to the provisions of Article 39.3.95 
On the other side, Skillington and Solovy have a different 
interpretation concerning what data falls under the provisions of Article 
39.3, namely that TRIPs Article 39.3 does not expressly limit 
protection to data submitted directly to the drug authority of the WTO 
member to acquire the protection.96 In this scheme, the drug authority 
may rely on the assessment and approval of the drug product in other 
countries, or if it requires the submission of test data to a 
nongovernmental research facility for its evaluation.97 Thus, contrary 
to Correa, Skillington and Solovy assert that Article 39.3 requires the 
protection of the data regardless of to which authority the data was 
submitted or who did the evaluation. This interpretation is predicated 
on the idea that, without their evaluation, they would not approve the 
marketing of this product in the country; therefore, protection is 
deemed necessary.98 
I have the same opinion of Correa, namely that where the submission 
of test data is not required, any submitted data should not receive 
 
92 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 336. 
93 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 72−73. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 47−52. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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protection under Article 39.3. This logic extends to situations where 
there has been reliance on other reference countries’ approval, 
particularly since this condition was omitted from the draft Article 
39.3. 
Nevertheless, some WTO members have resolved this debate by 
clarifying the issue in their Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), ultimately 
deciding this interpretive option is no longer available. For example, 
the U.S.-Jordan FTA specifies in article 4 footnote 11, “[i]t is 
understood that, in situations where there is reliance on evidence of 
approval in another country, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such 
information against unfair commercial use for the same period of time 
the other country is protecting such information against unfair 
commercial use.”99 Thus, the provisions of this FTA mean that Jordan 
cannot use this flexibility found in TRIPs. 
b. New Chemical Entity 
“[P]harmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which 
utilize new chemical entities . . .”100 
−New Definition, Local or Universal 
The second condition stated in Article 39.3 provides that in order to 
receive protection, test data should be related to a “new chemical 
entity” of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. In this 
condition, there is some ambiguity as to the parameters of the word 
“new,” and TRIPs did not provide a definition. The ordinary meaning 
of the word “new” is not existing before, of a kind now first invented 
or introduced; novel; or now known, experienced, used, etc. for the first 
time. According to Vienna Convention Article 31, the word should be 
interpreted according to its use within the context.101 There has been a 
schism here, with some considering that “new” should be interpreted 
as novel, as in the patent articles of the TRIPs Agreements, while others 
have interpreted it as used for the first time, because contextually the 
word refers to the status of a chemical entity within the drug regulatory 
authority.102 Also, issues have arisen as to whether the newness of a 
 
99 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 9, at 7. 
100 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 336. 
101 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 26−27. 
102 Id. 
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drug is to be determined universally or locally, if it is the first 
application in the world or in the member country.103 
Ultimately, the best course of action is for each member country to 
define a period after which the chemical entity will not be considered 
new. This action will encourage the originator drug company to register 
new chemical entities directly without any delay, and consequently the 
generic product will be in the market faster. 
−Known chemical entity 
Another issue is whether a chemical entity should be considered new 
if it was already known within another field, but a new therapeutic 
indication was found for this old chemical entity.104 On this account, 
one view, which is in line with TRIPs Article 39.3, states that if the 
chemical entity was previously received by the same drug regulatory 
authority105 it should be excluded and not acquire a protection period, 
even if the relevant authority required the submission of test data, such 
as new dosage forms, new combinations, new uses, crystalline forms, 
isomers, etc., of the old chemical entity.106 This view was supported by 
the European Court of Justice’s decision in Regina v. The Licensing 
Authority, ex parte Generics (1968) (UK).107 Here, the Court decided 
not to provide a new period of marketing exclusivity for a new 
indication, a new dosage form or a new dosage schedule.108 The 
European Court of Justice held that 
 [A] (second) product is essentially similar to an earlier approved 
product if the second product has the same qualitative and 
quantitative composition in terms of active principles, the same 
pharmaceutical form and is bio-equivalent to the first product, unless 
it is apparent in the light of scientific knowledge that it differs 
significantly from the original product as regards safety or 
efficacy.109 
 
103 Susan Scafidi, J.D., Case Study Question, How Do International Trade Agreements 
Influence the Promotion of Public Health?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 341, 343 
(2004) [hereinafter Scafidi]. 
104 Id. at 345. 
105 Id. See also Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 74−79. 
106 Scafidi, supra note 103. 
107 See Case C-368/96, The Queen v. Licensing Auth. ex parte Generics Ltd., Case C-
368/96 [1992] E.C.R. I-7967. 
108 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 75. 
109 Id. 
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In contrast to the European Court of Justice, the United States has 
elaborated this condition within its FTAs to include “new uses of old 
chemical entity,” i.e., “second indication,” new dosage forms and 
combinations. Article 4, footnote 10 of the U.S.-Jordan FTA adds the 
protection of new uses of old chemical entities for three years: “It is 
understood that protection for “new chemical entities” shall also 
include protection for new uses for old chemical entities for a period of 
three years.”110 
−Naturally and Biological products 
As with the words “known” and “new,” Article 39.3’s use of the 
word “chemical” has also prompted conflicting views as to what this 
entails. One view holds that the word “chemical” means biological 
products, and, thus, naturally occurring products are not protected.111 
Opposing this view, Skillington and Solovy hypothesized that this 
interpretation would discourage drug companies from investing in safe 
and effective, naturally occurring substances, such as biological 
substances which are not patentable and important in cancer 
therapies.112 These biotech products, like monoclonal antibodies, are 
very difficult for generic companies to develop and the absence of data 
exclusivity in a country would discourage the originator company from 
entering this market, which would have the deleterious effect of 
depriving people of the benefits of these drugs.113 
On the official front, The Jordan Food and Drug Administration 
(JFDA)114 provided a definition of “new chemical entity” in a circular 
from June 2009. In this circular, the JFDA holds that, in order to be 
considered new, a chemical entity should be submitted for registration 
to the JFDA within eighteen months of its first approval in any other 
countries.115 Additionally, the JFDA stated that isomers and new 
 
110 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 9, at 7. 
111 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 25−28. 
112 Id. 
113 Matilal, supra note 81, at 275. 
114 JORDAN FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.jfda.jo/Default.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2014). 
115 In an official circulation dated June 16, 2009, JFDA Director General of JFDA, Dr. 
M. Rawashdeh states: 
New Chemical Entity is the pharmaceutical product that contains active moiety or 
moieties that is responsible for physiological or pharmacological effect whereby no 
more than eighteen months have elapsed from the date of first registration of any of 
its ingredients (components) singly or collectively in any country in the world 
irrespective of any difference in, including but not limited to, type of salt, ester, 
isomer, complex or other derivative. A pharmaceutical product shall be considered 
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crystalline forms are not considered as new chemical entities.116 This 
point will be discussed in the second part of this paper. 
c. Undisclosed Data 
“[T]he submission of undisclosed test or other data . . .”117 
The third condition for gaining protection is that the test data should 
be undisclosed. This means disclosed information in the public domain 
will not granted any protection,118 and a generic company can rely on 
this published data to register its products. Also, if the relevant drug 
regulatory authority requires the submission of published data, then no 
protection will be granted.119 Skillington and Solovy commented on 
this point, namely that the test data should be undisclosed at the time 
of submission and the disclosure afterward does not end the protection 
period.120 Also, test data disclosure by a third party still requires 
protection against unfair commercial practices.121 
This condition necessitates that drug regulatory authorities ascertain 
whether the submitted data is disclosed or not before granting the 
protection period. Furthermore, the authority’s assessment as to 
whether the submitted data has been disclosed should not depend on 
the applicant’s declaration.122 The JFDA, among other drug regulatory 
authorities, does not investigate this point, although they do assess only 
the published data of Phase III.123 Nevertheless, they grant five years 
data exclusivity, as I will explain in the second part of this paper. 
 
to have the same chemical entity even if there is a difference in polymorph, 
metabolite, enantiomer, solvate, size of particles, formulation, combination, or 
method of use, pharmaceutical dosage form or concentration. 
This translation was adopted by the JFDA. Circulation No. 2/9/1/17645, June 16, 2009, in 
Official Gazette of Jordan [hereinafter JFDA Circulation]. 
116 Id. 
117 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
118 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 74. 
119 Id. at 73. 
120 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 32. 
121 Id. 
122 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 74. 
123 Ryan B. Abbott et al., The Price of Medicines in Jordan: The Cost of Trade-based 
Intellectual Property, 9 J. GENERIC MED. 75, 77 (2012) (“The JFDA does not check to see 
whether data submitted for regulatory approval has been previously disclosed.”). 
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d. Considerable Effort 
“[T]he submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination 
of which involves a considerable effort . . .”124 
Article 39.3 provides that the origination of test data should involve 
considerable effort, and drug regulatory authorities should ask the 
applicant to prove that the test data submitted is the result of 
considerable effort. The problem in applying this article is that the type 
of effort required and its magnitude are left vague.125 As per Skillington 
and Solovy, the ordinary meaning of “considerable” is “worthy of 
consideration or regard,” “of consequence or worthy of consideration 
by reason of magnitude,” or “somewhat large in amount, extent, 
duration.”126 The ordinary meaning of “effort” is “exertion or striving, 
physical or mental; a vigorous attempt” or “the result of any 
concentrated or special activity.”127 Therefore, it is likely that the term 
“considerable effort” would be interpreted to mean concentrated or 
special activities, physical or mental, that are extensive in scope or 
duration.128 The conduct of the tests needed to produce data required 
by health authorities would normally fall within this interpretation of 
the phrase “considerable efforts.”129 
Skillington and Solovy concluded that the origination of test data 
required by most drug regulatory authorities complies with the Article 
39.3’s requirement of considerable efforts.130 
2. TRIPs Obligations 
If the test data fulfills the above conditions, WTO members are 
obliged to protect it against disclosure and unfair commercial use.131 
Based on TRIPs Article 39.3, this protection is not absolute, because 
disclosure is permitted in a case where it is necessary to protect public 
health, and if steps are taken to ensure that the data is protected against 
unfair commercial use.132 Under the language of Article 39.3, granting 
marketing approval for a generic product based on its similarity to the 
 
124 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, at 336. 






131 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 75−76. 
132 Id. 
NSOUR (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2016  9:02 AM 
2016] Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: 281 
Was It the Best Choice for Jordan Under the 
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement? 
originator product may not be considered dishonest use.133 The 
definition of dishonest or unfair commercial practice is dependent on 
social perceptions in each country.134 
a. Nondisclosure 
Article 39.3 requires members to protect the submitted undisclosed 
data from disclosure without defining of the maximum period of 
preventing the disclosure, which is apparently until the submitted 
materials become known.135 However, there are two cases in which 
disclosure is permitted, according to this article. 
The first case is when the disclosure is important to protect the 
public; this exception is limited to the necessity degree which is 
according to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT/WTO 
rules, each country should determine when the necessity is found.136 
Nevertheless, Skillington and Solovy noticed that the cases that the 
disclosure would benefit the public are few,137 because the volume of 
these test data is huge, and it would be difficult to the public to read it 
unless they are experienced in this topic, and only competitors would 
benefit from this disclosure by using these data to submit their 
product.138 
The second case is when steps are taken to prevent unfair 
commercial use, how the protection is guaranteed and what is unfair 
commercial use is unclear.139 Skillington and Solovy concluded that the 
emphasis of this point for the second time in Article 39.3 requires 
members to provide additional regulations, like providing a much 
longer period of exclusivity in the case of disclosure.140 
b. Acts of Unfair Commercial Use 
“[S]hall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In 
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where necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to 
ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.”141 
Of all the competing views concerning the ambiguous language of 
Article 39.3, the interpretation of the above-referenced obligation has 
been the most controversial. This controversy has centered on the issue 
of whether it is an “unfair commercial use” where a drug regulatory 
authority relies on test data submitted by an originator drug company 
in its evaluation of a secondary applicant.142 
As discussed earlier, according to Vienna Convention, the 
interpretation should refer to the ordinary meaning of words in their 
relevant context, taking into account the agreement’s object and 
purpose, and should also look to the negotiation history of the legal 
instrument at issue.143 
In this case, the ordinary meaning of “unfair commercial use,” as 
stated by Skillington and Solovy, breaks down the term into its 
component parts: “The ordinary meaning of ‘unfair’ is ‘not equitable, 
unjust; not according to the rules, partial,’”144 and “[c]ommercial” 
means “engaged in the commerce of pertaining to, or bearing on 
commerce” or “interested in financial return rather than artistry; likely 
to make a profit; regarded as a mere matter of business.”145 Finally, 
“use” means an “action of using or state of being used; application or 
conversion to some purpose and ‘ability to be used, especially for a 
particular purpose; usefulness; advantage.’”146 
Heeding the analytical devices outlined in the Vienna Convention, 
going back to the negotiation history of this article reveals that, 
according to the United States’ proposal, a protection period of a 
minimum five years was included in the article draft. The text below is 
the draft presented to the Ministerial Conference in Brussels in 
December 1990: 
4A PARTIES, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of new pharmaceutical products or of a new agricultural 
chemical product, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, 
the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall [protect 
such data against unfair commercial use. Unless the person 
submitting the information agrees, the data may not be relied upon 
 
141 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
142 Correa, Unfair Competition, supra note 74, at 76−77. 
143 Id. 
144 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 29−30. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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for the approval of competing products for a reasonable time, 
generally no less than five years, commensurate with the efforts 
involved in the origination of the data, their nature, and the 
expenditure involved in their preparation. In addition, PARTIES 
shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to 
protect the public.147 
The draft text148 included two points that were omitted in the final 
text. First, a prohibition on authorities’ reliance on previously 
submitted test data as a basis for the approval of competing products;149 
and, second, a statement requiring a minimum protection period of five 
years.150 
The omission of these points in the final text has been interpreted 
differently.151 
For one, Correa argued that the U.S. draft proposal of Article 39.3 
did not have the support of WTO members. Therefore, Correa’s view 
holds that because these provisions were purposely removed due to a 
lack of consensus, Article 39.3 should not be interpreted on the basis 
of this draft which the supporters of data exclusivity regime are 
referring.152 Moreover, despite the opportunity to do so, the final text 
knowingly does not include a prohibition relating to an authority’s 
reliance on submitted data when evaluating subsequent applications, 
nor does the final text contain any language suggesting such a practice 
is an “unfair commercial use.” Correa, interpreting this article 
according to the ordinary meaning of the words in light of their context, 
found that the plain language of Article 39.3, in addition to its 
negotiation history, does not require exclusive rights.153 Instead, the 
obligations of this article can be fulfilled by other approaches, the 
particular approach being left to each individual country’s judgment.154 
 
147 Id. See also TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE, Draft Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT. Doc. 
MTN.TNC/W/35 (Dec. 3, 1990) [hereinafter Draft Final Act]. 
148 Draft Final Act, supra note 147; see also Chapter 28: Undisclosed Information in 
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT at 526, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD) (Nov. 30, 2004) (discussing the import 
of the various omissions in the final text of the TRIPs Agreement). 
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Correa acknowledges that Article 39.3 does impose an unequivocal 
duty on WTO members that obliges them to protect any applicable test 
data.155 Ultimately, though, Correa concludes that a government 
authority’s reliance on earlier-submitted test data does not constitute 
unfair commercial use.156 Correa referred to the “UNCTAD” 
conference in relation to this article in supporting his interpretation 157 
Correa arrived at the above-discussed conclusion by parsing out the 
operative terms of Article 39.3 on a linguistic level. The word “unfair,” 
for example, should be interpreted in accordance with Article 39.1’s 
reference to Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention,158 which allows 
differences between countries in defining “unfair commercial use.”159 
In defining “commercial,” Correa posits that commercial use should be 
in reference to an entity that is already on the market. Regarding word 
use,160 he explained that there are different approaches followed by 
drug regulatory authorities when approving a generic product (1) Some 
authorities require the generic product producer to submit its own test 
data; (2) Others rely on originator test data after payment has been 
made to compensate the originator for the expense of generating the 
test data; (3) Certain regulatory authorities rely on the originator test 
data in order to approve the generic product; (4) And, finally, a fourth 
approach to approving a generic product sees numerous regulatory 
authorities approve the generic product without examining the 
originator test data.161 According to Correa, none of the above 
approaches could be considered unfair commercial uses, as the generic 
company is not accessing the originator test data by himself.162 
According to Correa, this interpretation has judicial support in two 
cases: in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,163 a U.S. case, and in Bayer v. 




157 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The TRIPs Agreement and Developing 
Countries (1996), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, http://unctad.org/en/docs/ite1_en.pdf. 






164 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (holding that any inquiry 
into whether a governmental agency runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution where it discloses a 
company’s submitted test data requires a court to assess “the character of the governmental 
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed 
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both courts held that the government’s approval of a subsequent 
application on the basis of an originator’s prior registration was proper. 
As to these outcomes, some countries may consider a health authority’s 
reliance on test data to approve a second entrant to be an “unfair 
commercial use,” while others may not. As with the U.S. and Canada, 
however, each country is free to give effect to its own interpretation, 
done according to each country’s values and competitive advantages.165 
In 2001, developing countries submitted a group paper to the TRIPs 
council confirming their position against data exclusivity.166 In this 
paper, these countries clarified that it is their collective interpretation 
that there is no data exclusivity requirement within the text of TRIPs 
Article 39.3. Following from this premise, the developing countries 
asserted their position that a drug regulatory authority’s reliance on 
originator test data as a basis for granting approval to a generic product, 
did not constitute an “unfair commercial use.” Thus, any such reliance 
does not necessitate the wait period established under the data 
exclusivity regime.167 Instead, the developing countries saw that an 
“unfair commercial use” occurred where generic companies directly 
accessed the originator’s submitted test data. As such, Article 39.3 
required drug regulatory authorities to protect an originator’s 
undisclosed test data against subsequent improper disclosure, and 
should put in place a legal framework to prevent generic companies 
from accessing the undisclosed data. The position of the developing 
countries can be summarized as follows:168 the protection is to be 
granted against ‘unfair commercial use’ of confidential data. This 
means that a third party could be prevented from using the results of 
test undertaken by another company as background for an independent 
 
expectations”) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); see 
also Bayer v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999], 243 N.R. 170 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.), appeal 
denied [2000] 259 N.R. 200 (Can.). In this case, the court held that a generic product may 
be approved by a regulatory authority “by showing that the[ir] product is the pharmaceutical 
and bioequivalent of the [originator’s] product.” However, if the generic product’s approval 
is predicated on the basis of data submitted by the originator company, then the five-year 
data exclusivity period will be applicable. The Bayer Court justified this holding on the 
rationale that in the aforementioned scenario, “the safety and effectiveness of the generic 
product will only be established by reference to confidential information provided to the 
Minister by the [originator].”). 
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submission for marketing approval,169 if the data had been acquired 
through dishonest commercial practices.170 However, Article 39.3 does 
permit a national competent authority to rely on data in its possession 
to assess further applications, relating to the same drug, since this 
would not imply unfair commercial use.171 
A second interpretation of what Article 39.3 mandates in terms of 
data protection is presented in the work of Skillington and Solovy, 
which supports the data exclusivity approach, contingent on the 
negotiation history of the relevant legal instrument.172 Skillington and 
Solovy point to an interpretation of “unfair commercial use” provided 
by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) as evidence of 
support for their position. The USTR provided the following 
interpretation of “unfair commercial use” in light of the negotiating 
history in 1995, after the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement:173 
 TRIPs negotiators understood it [the term “unfair commercial 
use”] to mean that the data will not be used to support, clear or 
otherwise review other applications for marketing approval for a set 
amount of time unless authorized by the original submitter of the 
data.174 Any other definition of this term would be inconsistent with 
the logic and the negotiating history of the provision.175 
In addition to this statement by the USTR, Skillington and Solovy 
present a statement made by the New Zealand government, a statement 
they see as espousing the data exclusivity approach:176 
 Defining ‘unfair commercial use’ can only properly be done by 
reference to the context of the complete provision, i.e., the purpose 
behind the provision. In the light of this, we interpreted Article 39.3 
as meaning that there is a restriction on the use which regulatory 
authorities can make of original data they hold in order to approve 
subsequent applications for approval of generic medicines, animal 
remedies or pesticides. In other words, where undisclosed 
information is provided to a regulatory authority by an applicant so 
that the authority can approve the applicant’s product, if this 
 
169 Matilal, supra note 81, at 271−72. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 




176 Id. See also INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOC., 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA 
EXCLUSIVITY 2 (2000), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/en/Data 
Exclusivity_2000.pdf [hereinafter IFPMA]. 
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information is then used by the authority to approve the product of a 
second applicant this is, in New Zealand’s view, ‘unfair commercial 
use.’177 In effect, the regulatory authority is giving a commercial 
advantage to the second applicant in that the applicant does not have 
to generate the data which was required of the first applicant. This 
can be a significant economic saving.178 
Skillington and Solovy arsenal of support for data exclusivity goes 
on to include a statement from the European Commission:179 
 Both the logic and the negotiating history of Article 39.3 of TRIPs 
leave no doubt that providing data exclusivity for a certain period of 
time was the envisaged way to protect data against unfair commercial 
use as prescribed by Article 39.3. Whether any system other than data 
exclusivity over a reasonable period of time would meet the 
requirements of Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement is to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, but examples of actual application 
by WTO Members of alternative—and TRIPs compliant—systems 
to nonreliance over a reasonable period do not appear to exist.180 
In addition Skillington and Solovy have referred to one of the views 
that the members who are approving the reliance on test data are 
protecting test data against disclosure and not protecting the data from 
unfair commercial use. This practice violates TRIPs Article 39.3.181 
Because the TRIPs Agreement does not specify any particular 
protection period, those endorsing the data exclusivity approach must 
account for this. Here, Skillington and Solovy advance the idea that the 
appropriate waiting period reaches its conclusion when the originator 
company recovers the cost invested in originating the test data. 
Functionally, the usual period under this rubric is five to ten years, 
depending on both the effort expended and the country at issue.182 
Overall, Skillington and Solovy’s work confirms their joint position 
that data exclusivity is the best approach to satisfy the purpose of data 
protection, which in their view, is to encourage originator companies 
 
177 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 31. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLICATION ON QUESTIONS ON TRIPS AND 
DATA EXCLUSIVITY: AN EU CONTRIBUTION 18−22 (2001), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib 
/docs/2006/may/tradoc_122031.pdf. 
181 Skillington & Solovy, supra note 62, at 33−34. 
182 Id. 
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to invest more in the invention of new drugs and, correspondingly, to 
provide the incentives to accomplish greater investment.183 
Concerning the economic implications of the data exclusivity 
approach, Sheryia, like Skillington and Solovy, espouses the view that 
a failure to implement the data exclusivity regime serves narrow self-
interests, a condition that will ultimately lead to serious economic 
problems by destabilizing the incentive balance that intellectual 
property provides to originator companies to invest more in developing 
drugs.184 Moreover, an economic landscape without data exclusivity 
protections will produce originator companies that are reluctant to enter 
developing countries’ markets, the consequence of which will be a lack 
of the supply to those countries.185 
To summarize the preceding section, the controversy surrounding 
the interpretation of Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement allows for 
the conclusion that the open-ended language of Article 39.3 was 
intentional, left on purpose for each member country to apply the 
protection approach that conforms best to its need for better health and 
economic situations, areas in which there is chasm of difference 
between developed and developing countries.186 If the data exclusivity 
regime, which is supported by developed countries like the United 
States and the European Union, fulfills their economic and health 
needs, this does not mean it will be the appropriate approach for 
developing countries.187 
Up until now, there has been no WTO ruling regarding members that 
have not implemented exclusive rights.188 In one case, the U.S. initiated 
a case against Argentina for its failure to properly implement 
protections for test data.189 This dispute was resolved after two years of 
discussion, and in the end, Argentina did not change its law nor did it 
 
183 Id. 
184 Matilal, supra note 81, at 269. 
185 Id. 
186 CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR 
THE REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE 




189 Argentina—Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for 
Agricultural Chemicals—Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the 
Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement, WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4 (June 20, 2002); see 
also CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 186. 
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apply exclusive rights.190 In addition, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) has listed, under the special section of 301 of 
the Trade Act, many countries that it does not see as applying adequate 
protection for test data.191 
Bilateral agreements were the solution for some countries like the 
U.S. in which they elaborated on the standards of regulatory data 
protection and were able to secure greater intellectual property than that 
which was provided in Article 39.3.192 These bilateral agreements, 
known as TRIPs-plus or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), have defined 
the protection period and extended the protection term to include not 
only NCEs but, among others, new uses of old chemical entities and 
new dosage forms.193 
D. Jordan Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law 
In Article 8 of its Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law of 
2000, Jordan adopted a five-year data exclusivity period for NCEs.194 
As discussed above, though the TRIPs Agreement did not require a 
member state to implement any particular exclusivity period, Jordan 
forewent this freedom for political reasons, and its adoption of a five-
 
190 Correa, SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 186, at 6−7. 
191 Id. 
192 Anthony Taubman, Unfair Competition and the Financing of Public-Knowledge 
Goods: The Problem of Test Data Protection, 3 OXFORD J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 594 
(2008). 
193 Malpani, supra note 16, at 11. 
194 Article 8 states: 
If an official party stipulated, for approving for the marketing of pharmaceuticals, or 
agrochemical products in which new chemical materials are used, the submission of 
secret formulae or any data attained through considerable efforts such party should 
observe the following:  
A. The protection of such data from the unclassified commercial use, through 
preventing any other person who did not obtain the applicant approval from 
depending thereon for marketing his pharmaceuticals and products except after 5 
years as of the date of the applicant obtaining any approval for marketing his 
products. 
B. Protecting such data from disclosure, unless: 
1. The disclosure is necessary for protecting the public. 
2. The official party has taken the necessary steps for the protection from 
unclassified commercial use of such data. The translation of the word 
“unclassified” is not correct, the right translation is (unfair). 
Unfair Competition Law, supra note 8  art. 8. 
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year data exclusivity period was done as part of its accession to the 
WTO. 
In the same year, Jordan signed a bilateral agreement, an FTA, with 
the United States.195 This FTA includes more intellectual property 
constraints. These new obligations are: 
− To accede to or ratify the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT); until 
now Jordan did not accede to the PCT.196 
− Notification System; the JFDA has effectuated this obligation by 
publishing all submitted registration application on its website.197 
− Grounds for the issuance of compulsory licenses are limited to a 
situation where such a license is a necessary to remedy an anti-
competitive practice, in case of public noncommercial use, or in the 
case of national emergency or other situations of extreme urgency.198 
And, on the ground of failure to meet working requirements, it is 
provided that importation shall constitute working.199 
− Patent extension to compensate for the delay in marketing 
approval process.200 
− Data exclusivity period of three years for new uses of old chemical 
entities.201 
− In case of reliance on another drug regulatory authority’s 
approval, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such information against 
unfair commercial use for the same period of time the other country is 
protecting such information against unfair commercial use. 
Therefore, the U.S-Jordan FTA added two additional constraints 
regarding protection of test data, one constraint through the addition of 
a data exclusivity period of three years for new uses of old chemical 
entities, and the other by the FTA’s consideration that reliance on the 
other reference drug regulatory authority should be granted a data 
exclusivity period similar to that country. Ultimately, these constraints 
in the U.S-Jordan FTA have the effect of denying Jordan the freedom 
to apply other data protection approaches and thus benefiting from the 
flexibilities found in the TRIPs Agreement.202 
 
195 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 9. 
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II 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The Jordan Administration of Food and Drugs (JFDA) is the 
authority responsible for enforcing data exclusivity in Jordan. To this 
effect, the JFDA implemented data exclusivity protections for NCEs 
after the adoption of the Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law in 
2000. Furthermore, the JFDA have allowed for the newly adopted data 
exclusivity provisions to be applied retroactively, meaning that NCEs 
approved prior to Jordan’s adoption of the Unfair Competition and 
Trade Secrets law would now be granted the protections of the data 
exclusivity regime.203 The effect of the JFDA’s retroactive 
implementation of data exclusivity was to block the registration of 
many generic products, which affected the local industry 
extensively.204 Meanwhile, the JFDA began enforcing data exclusivity 
protection for new uses of existing chemical entities in December of 
2004, at the end of the three-year grace period after signing the US-
Jordan FTA.205 
In this Part, I will discuss the procedure followed by the JFDA to 
implement data exclusivity protection, and I will assess the impact of 
data exclusivity in Jordan with regard to access to affordable medicine, 
foreign investments in Jordan and its cumulative effect on the local 
pharmaceutical industry. 
A. JFDA Data Exclusivity Implementation Procedure 
In the period after Jordan’s acceptance of the data exclusivity 
regime, it restricted the submission of the registration file of a generic 
product until the final year of the data exclusivity period for the 
originator product. In turn, the marketing approval for a generic 
product will become effective at the end of this data exclusivity period 
as per the drug registration criteria.206 
 
203 Ryan B. Abbot et al., The Price of Medicines in Jordan: The Cost of Trade-Based 
Intellectual Property, 9 J. GENERIC MED. 75 (2012), [hereinafter Abbot], http://academic 
.ju.edu.jo/i.abbadi/Lists/PublishedResearches/DispForm.aspx?ID=4&ContentTypeId=0x0
10028AB12C9A1820347BFF3C806BD2A70BB. 
204 E-mail from Hiba Zarour, Hikma Pharmaceuticals to Wael Armouti (Aug. 31, 2014). 
205 Id. 
206 The Criteria of Registration of Drugs (Regulation of Drug Registration and Its 
Amendments), OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF JORDAN NO. 4639 (2014), [hereinafter Registration 
of Drugs], http://www.jfda.jo/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
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However, the criteria used by the JFDA for granting data exclusivity 
for NCEs and for new uses of existing chemical entities are, 
unfortunately, not well defined.207 In fact, the JFDA does not 
investigate whether the test data at issue, that which was submitted with 
the originator product, even fulfills all the conditions of Article 39.3 of 
the TRIPs Agreement prerequisite to data exclusivity protection.208 
As discussed above, the four conditions to be fulfilled are: 
1. Data necessary for marketing approval: The JFDA requests the 
submission of preclinical and clinical data as a condition of approval 
of a new product, and does not rely on other countries approval.209 The 
JFDA in its registration criteria requests the marketing of a new product 
for at least one year for safety purposes. The submitted test data are 
assessed by the technical committee for new products which contain 
clinicians and academic experts.210 
2. NCE definition: The JFDA, along with the collaboration of 
Jordan’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, issued a circular defining 
NCE in June of 2009. This definition was the result of the efforts 
undertaken by the Jordanian Association of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers (JAPM)211 to define both the NCE and the period after 
which the active ingredient will no longer be considered as a NCE.212 
The JAPM supported its request through a legal consultation with an 
American law firm and through World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) consultation, in which both confirmed that 
nothing prevented Jordan from legislatively adopting its own definition 
for NCE. Jordan would still meet the obligations found in both the 
TRIPs Agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA. Also, the American 
counsel and WIPO both confirmed that the practice of adopting its own 
definition of an Article 39.3 term had already implemented by some 
countries such as Israel.213 Additionally, the JAPM supported its 
 
207 Id. 
208 Saad Abughanm, The Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data under TRIPs 
and the U.S.-Jordan FTA: Exploring the Limits of Obligations and Flexibilities: A Study of 
the Impacts on the Pharmaceutical Sector in Jordan (Apr. 29, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Toronto) at 327 [hereinafter Abughanm], https://tspace.library 
.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/32296/1/Abughanm_Saad_A_201203_SJD_thesis.pdf. 
209 Interview with Wesal Haqaish, Lina Bajjali, Maha Jaghbeer, Department Officials, 
JFDA (Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Haqaish Interview]. 
210 Id. 
211 JORDANIAN ASSOCIATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, http://www 
.japm.com (last visited May 3, 2015). 
212 Letter from JAPM to Ministry of Health, No. 163/2007 (June 3, 2007). 
213 Id. 
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request that Jordan adopt its own definition of NCE by referencing the 
current position of the United States, a position made clear in a letter 
authored by various members of the U.S. Congress which was 
addressed to the USTR, Ambassador Susan Schwab The letter 
emphasized the right of nations to use the flexibilities found in the 
TRIPs Agreement so as to promote better access to affordable 
medicine.214 The letter stated that the provisions found in current FTAs 
have extended the monopolies of the originator companies without 
taking into consideration public health and the right of access to 
affordable medicine, and they should revise the provisions of 
intellectual property rights related to pharmaceuticals found in the 
FTAs under consideration.215 
This circular provides a definition of NCE which excludes many 
products that used to be considered NCEs, such as isomers and 
different salts. In addition, it limits the period, to eighteen months, 
during which the originator can submit the NCE registration file to the 
JFDA in order to get the data exclusivity of five years,216 an inclusion 
designed to prevent the delay in introducing an NCE, which would 
consequently the generic version of the NCE at issue.217 
After issuing this circular, the JFDA’s stated practice was to 
investigate whether the originator product fulfills the conditions stated 
therein. In several cases, the originator product came after the allotted 
eighteen-month period and, as a result, was not granted a five-year data 
exclusivity period.218 Additionally, the JFDA’s practice is to grant five 
years of data exclusivity protection for biological products which are 
not considered to be chemical entities; many countries do not grant data 
exclusivity for those products under these circumstances.219 In 2006, 
the Minister of Trade and Industry issued a letter to the JFDA 
instructing it to define new uses as new therapeutic indications only 
and to exclude new dosage forms, new routes of administration as well 
 
214 Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman et al., (Mar. 12, 2007), [hereinafter Letter to 
Ambassador Schwab], http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/congressional-schwab 
letter-thailand-10 jan06.pdf (Members of U.S. Cong., to Ambassador Susan C. Schwab, 
U.S. Trade Representative). 
215 Id. 
216 Circulation, supra note 115. 
217 Id. 
218 Haqaish Interview, supra note 209. 
219 Id. 
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as new strengths from this definition.220 Furthermore, the eighteen-
month period afforded to a drug in order to be considered new is not 
applicable to new uses.221 Despite these constraints, the effect of new 
uses is less harmful than for NCEs, because the generic product can 
register its product with the old use. The only condition to which a 
generic producer is subjected is the requirement that it not mention the 
new use on the leaflet. In practice, however, the generic product is 
marketed with the new use as an “off-label” use.222 Together, these two 
circulars are considered to be one of the major steps the JFDA has taken 
to mitigate the negative effects of data exclusivity within the country.223 
3. Undisclosed Data: The JFDA does not examine whether the 
submitted data are confidential and not published. On the contrary, they 
request Phase III of the clinical trials to be published.224 This practice 
of the JFDA does not fulfill the requirements Article 39.3 of the TRIPs 
Agreement as to data confidentiality. 
4. Considerable efforts: The JFDA does not examine if the 
generation of the submitted data involves considerable efforts nor has 
a definition of considerable efforts, a practice that also fails to meet the 
standards set forth in the TRIPs Agreement.225 
The JFDA does not examine whether the submitted test data are 
confidential or whether its generation involves considerable efforts. 
The JFDA should define these two conditions and require the originator 
company to submit a declaration or certificate stating how these 
conditions are fulfilled.226 
B. Data Exclusivity Statistics 
Each February, the United States Embassy in Amman submits a 
letter to the Ministry of Industry and Trade addressing the efforts made 
by the different Jordanian agencies that are responsible for protecting 
and enforcing intellectual property rights (IPR).227 This letter 
announces the start of the annual procedure of “Special 301” to 
 
220 Id. 
221 Letter from Ministry and Trade to JFDA, No 18/1/15331 (June 6, 2006). 
222 Abbott, supra note 203. 
223 Abughanm, supra note 208, at 331. 
224 Haqaish Interview, supra note 209. 
225 Id. 
226 Abughanm, supra note 208, at 284−87. 
227 See, e.g., SPECIAL 301 REPORT, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP. (2004), https://ustr.gov 
/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Special_301/asset_up
load_file963_5996.pdf. 
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examine countries’ protection and enforcement of IPR. The following 
agencies are requested to submit their position: Ministry of Industry 
and Trade; the National Library Department of Culture; the 
Audiovisual Commission; the Jordan Institution of Standards and 
Metrology (JISM); the Jordan Food and Drug Administration (JFDA); 
the Jordan Customs Department, the Public Security Department; and 
the Ministry of Justice.”228 
In the JFDA’s annual position paper, it emphasized its efforts to 
enforce data exclusivity as found in Article 8 of the Jordanian Unfair 
Competition and Trade Secrets Law and in the U.S.-Jordan FTA.229 As 
evidence of enforcement, the JFDA states the number of seized 
counterfeit drugs during the preceding year.230 In the last report issued 
by the JFDA, issued in February of 2014, regarding the enforcement of 
the data exclusivity until 2013, the JFDA announced that it is 
committed to implementing five-year data exclusivity for any NCE, 
calculated from the date of marketing approval of the product.231 Since 
2000, 357 NCEs have been granted this five years of data exclusivity,232 
and the number of new uses granted three years of protection period 
comes in at 61, as recorded from December of 2004.233 Furthermore, 
the JFDA report emphasizes that it is complying with the U.S.-Jordan 
FTA notification obligation for the originator companies concerning 
the submitted applications of generic products. The JFDA has 
accomplished this by publishing all the submitted registration 
applications on its website.234 
After applying the NCE definition adopted in 2009, the number of 
NCEs granted five years’ data exclusivity was drastically reduced:235 
From 2000–2009, 335 NCEs were granted five years data exclusivity 
products,236 as compared to the period 2010–2013, in which only 22 
NCEs received this same protection.237 
 
228 Id. 
229 JFDA position paper submitted to the U.S. embassy regarding enforcing data 
exclusivity (JFDA Data 2000-2014) [hereinafter Jordan Position Paper]. 
230 Id. 
231 JFDA letter to Ministry of Industry and Trade, No. 1/1/14/4442 (Feb. 9, 2014). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
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C. Judicial Opinion (Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) vs. JFDA) 
To date, only one case related to data exclusivity has been filed 
against the JFDA, the 2003 case Merck Sharp & Dohme v. JFDA.238 
The case was filed against the director of the JFDA, the JFDA board 
and against the High Committee of Drug at the JFDA. The plaintiff, 
MSD, had objected to the 2013 registration of a local generic product 
Alendomax (70 mg) by the Jordan Sweden Medical and Sterilization 
(JOSWE), claiming that the JFDA violated Article 8 of the Unfair 
Competition and Trade Secrets Law and Article 39.3 of TRIPs by not 
implementing the five years’ data exclusivity for its originating 
product, Fosamax (70 mg). MSD asserted that this product merited data 
exclusivity protection period due to its new strength considered that its 
new strength 70 mg deserves the five years data exclusivity. MSD has 
previously registered Fosamax at a dosage of 10 mg. in 2008. 
However, the case was dismissed for jurisdictional infirmities, 
claiming MSG had not brought suit against the appropriate committee 
(Technical Committee for Generic Drugs),239 and consequently the 
court did not discuss the fact that a new strength for an old chemical 
entity does not require data exclusivity, nor did it discuss other 
technical issues material to the case. 
D. Potential Impacts of Data Exclusivity in Jordan 
Data exclusivity has influenced Jordan from many points of view, 
notably including price increases and a decrease in access to affordable 
medicines. Moreover, the promise of the data exclusivity approach 
bringing more foreign investments to Jordan did not come to fruition, 
nor did greater IPR protection promote local industry research in the 
manner prognosticated by proponents of the data exclusivity regime. 
1. Access to Affordable Medicine 
In order to control diseases, people must be able to access affordable 
medicines. International human rights have stated that access to 
affordable medicine, health facilities and services should be accessible 
to all without discrimination.240 Instead of enabling this internationally 
mandated access to affordable medicines, the data exclusivity approach 
 
238 Merck Sharp & Dohme et al. v. Jordanian Food & Drug Adminstration, Decision of 
the Jordanian High Court of Justice No. 512/2003, (Jan. 1, 2013). 
239 Id. 
240 Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns Within the Framework of 
International Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 141 (2010). 
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operates by delaying the entrance of generic (affordable) medicines 
into the market, which has the consequence of increasing the monopoly 
duration of the originator companies.241 Under this regime, prices of 
medicine will increase by 20%, according to the pricing regulations 
which give the generic product a maximum of 80% of the originator 
product’s price. Also, after the entrance of the generic product, some 
originators decrease their prices.242 According to an Oxfam report, data 
exclusivity has contributed to the problem by comparing the prices of 
selective medicines between Jordan and Egypt. This comparison 
illustrates the fact that prices in Jordan are much higher than Egypt, 
which is not currently implementing data exclusivity protection.243 Dr. 
Michael P. Ryan has responded to this Oxfam report, indicating that 
Jordanian prices are similar to prices in Saudi Arabia, and the pricing 
is according to the pricing regulation at the JFDA.244 Dr. Ryan did not 
take into account, however, the fact that for more than five years only 
the originator product will be present on the market. 
Another proponent of data exclusivity, the former PhRMA chairman 
in Jordan, posits that data exclusivity has helped the originator 
companies to provide people around the world with new molecules and 
has ultimately led to better health.245 
Jordanians obtain medicine through either the public or private 
system. The public insurances cover 55% of the Jordanian 
population,246 and this system buys the medicines through tenders 
announced by the Joint Procurement Department (JPD). Data 
exclusivity’s effect on the prices is very obvious when one looks at the 
assigned prices for the tenders. The government is obliged to buy the 
 
241 Bashar H. Malkawi, Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Jordan, 4 
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93 (2009) [hereinafter Malkawi]. 
242 Id. 
243 Malpani, supra note 16. 
244 Michael Ryan, Intellectual Property Reforms, Pharmaceuticals, and Health 
Competitiveness in Jordan: Misunderstanding and Misinformation from 102 OXFAM 
INTERNATIONAL 2, CREATIVE & INNOVATIVE ECONOMY CENTER, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER (2007) [hereinafter Ryan]; see generally Roy Zwhalen, Data 
Protection, the Trans Pacific Partnership, and the U.S.-Jordan FTA, BIOTECHNOW.COM, 
http://www.biotech-now.org/public-policy/patently-biotech/2011/09/data-protection-the      
-trans-pacific-partnership-and-the-us-jordan-fta-post (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
245 Interview with Nafez Sutari, Pharma chairman (2010−2011), (Oct. 21, 2014) 
[hereinafter Sutari Interview]. 
246 JORDAN DEPT. OF STATISTICS, REPORT OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN JORDAN (2010), 
http://www.dos.gov.jo/sdb/dos_home/dos_home_a/health_ins.pdf. 
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originator product for almost six years with no competition from the 
generic product.247 After the approval of a generic product, the 
originator product price will come down. The JAPM has conducted an 
analysis study of the official tender (JPD) prices in 2009, 2010 and 
2011.248 This study showed the cost savings for the government after 
the availability of the local generic products.249 The prices of the local 
generic products in 2009 and 2010 JPD tenders for ten therapeutic 
groups were less than the second bidders, at $25 million JPD. Table 1 
illustrates the savings that resulted from buying local generic products, 
as compared to the originator prices for these two years.250 
 
System 2009 2010 
Antiobiotics 1,956,498.1100 1,173,401.8240 
GI 1,912,968.1250 34,404.5800 
Respiratory 275,010.2800 206,476.0000 
Neuromuscular 3,891,611.7092 926,471.3680 
Neutritions 43,365.9250 1,803,268.1000 
Cardiovascular 8,418,327.8305 1,694,837.1760 
Cutaneous 759,014.7740 527,354.8200 
Anesthesia 188,055.4210 120,173.7600 
Ophthalmics 319,820.1000 87,579.6000 
Endo-Gyne 24,774.7200 1,298,258.4500 
Total JDs 17,789,446.9947 7,872,225.6780 
Table 1. The savings from buying Jordanian pharmaceutical products 
compared to prices bid by multinational pharmaceutical companies in 2009 
and 2010.251 
After the introduction of the local generic products in the JPD tender, 
the originator companies have reduced their products prices. The 
originators price reduction in twelve therapeutic groups was around 14 
million JD in 2010 tender and around 1.7 million JD in 2011 tender 
 
247 Abbot, supra note 203. 
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compared to their prices for the year before local generic products were 
introduced. 
Table 2 illustrates the difference in prices bid by originator 
companies before and after the participation of Jordanian 
pharmaceutical companies in tenders of the same products.252 
 
Table 2. The difference in prices bid by multinational pharmaceutical 
companies before and after participation of Jordanian pharmaceutical 
companies in tenders of the same products.253 
The study concluded that there was a reduction in the government’s 
spending on pharmaceuticals in the public health sector after the 
generic product was made available.254 This will lead to better 
utilization of our limited resources.255 
Also, the JAPM has conducted an analysis of the price of a cancer 
product in public tenders. The 2009 tender price of this drug was 






System 2010 2011 
Antibiotics 2,320,042.4356 350,852.5855 
GI tract 28,365.8800 11,425.4896 
Respiratory 62,043.8480 139,480.4303 
Neuromuscular 9,459,931.1424 341,010.6933 
Nutrition 436.5150 2.8000 
Vaccines 1,400,792.0000 29,248.8400 
Cardiovascular 461,551.6651 12,693.8667 
Cancer  525,459.2660 115,349.9840 
Cutaneous 8,658.6700 71,520.8000 
Anesthesia 38,089.6320 26,229.3907 
Ophthalmic 8,471.1800 169,423.8700 
Endo-Gyne 281,067.2287 492,235.0950 
Total 14,594,909.4627 JDs  1,761,484.8451 JDs 
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with a public price of 86.700 JD. Thus, the price of the generic product 
was half the tender price. In 2010 tender, the originator product’s tender 
price was 56.000 JD, nearly 33% of the previous year’s tender price.256 
 
 
Chart 1. The price difference between JPD tender of 2009 and 2010 of an 
originator cancer product after the introduction of the local generic 
product.257 
Additionally, the JAPM has analyzed the prices of six products from 
the same therapeutic category in the 2010 tender. Here, the originator 
product’s price was 3128290 JD while the local generic product’s price 
for the same category was 1084806. That is, the percentage reduction 
on government spending due to the availability local generic product is 
more than 71%, with a 2 million JD saving.258 Chart 2 represents this 
saving. 
 
Chart 2. The price difference of six products from the same therapeutic 
category between the local generic products and originator products in tender 
JPD 2010 for one therapeutic category. 
Uninsured people buy through the second system, the private 
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JFDA’s pricing regulations which assign a fixed public price. The 
JFDA will assign the lowest price after analyzing the following criteria: 
country of origin price; export price based on cost; insurance and 
freight; and Saudi Arabia cost or the median price of at least three 
countries out of seven specified European countries. The same 
principle is applied for pricing the generic product with a ceiling of a 
maximum 80% of the originator product price from the current price, 
registration price or re-registration price, whichever is lowest.259 The 
pharmacy profit margin is fixed at 26%, so the pharmacist will derive 
more benefit by selling the originator product.260 
2. Investments 
Since 2001, no real foreign investments from originator companies 
in Jordan have materialized. There are two types of investment that 
have been introduced. The first is the expansion of originator 
companies’ scientific offices, which has had a negative impact on the 
local industry due to the aggressive sales tactics employed by these 
companies, those with which the local industry cannot compete. 
The other type of investment is contract manufacturing with local 
industry, manifested as secondary packaging only without any transfer 
of product know-how. The reason for this was to obtain a higher public 
price for the originator product, based on considering Jordan as country 
of origin. This is evident when we compare the Jordanian situation with 
that in neighboring country Egypt, which has many originator 
companies with manufacturing sites therein.261 Dr. Ryan has responded 
to the dearth of investment in the country by claiming that Jordan is a 
small pharmaceutical market in the region and that there is no reason 
to invest in manufacturing capacity. Additionally, he claims that 
medical tourism had grown due to implementation strong IPR.262 This 
position was confirmed by the ex-chairman of PhRMA in Jordan, who 
 
259 The Criteria of Pricing Drugs (Regulation of Pricing Drugs, 2012), in JORDANIAN 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 5164 /2012, http://jfda-apps01:3334/ (last visited  Oct. 10, 2014). 
260 Letter from Prime Minister of Jordan, to Jordan Ministry of Health, No. 10/48/4845 
(July 26, 1979); Letter from Prime Minister of Jordan, to Jordan Ministry of Health, No. 12 
(June 30, 2002). 
261 Malpani, supra note 18. 
262 Ryan, supra note 244. 
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insisted that hospitals, doctors and pharmacies have benefited from 
health tourism due to drug availability.263 
Furthermore, Originator companies are now conducting clinical 
trials in Jordan Research Centers because of the availability of a strong 
IPR environment.264 
3. Promotion of Pharmaceutical Local Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the leading industries in 
Jordan. There are sixteen private companies.265 The number of 
employees includes approximately 5,500 directly employed workers 
and 5,000 indirectly employed workers, with 99% of this employment 
being Jordanian. The percentage of females employed is 37%, 67% of 
which have university degrees.266 This sector is characterized as the 
highest-paid sector in Jordan.267 The investment in this sector is around 
$1 billion U.S. dollar and another $1 billion U.S. dollar in branches 
which are 17 branches in 8 countries.268 
Eighty-one percent of local production is exported to 60 countries 
because of the high quality reputation of the local pharmaceutical 
industry, and it is considered number one between the Arab 
countries.269 Chart 3 represents the export of the local industry between 
2004-2013.270 
 
Chart 3. The export of the local industry between 2004-2013 (U.S. Million 
Dollars) 
 
263 Sutari Interview, supra note 245. 
264 Ryan, supra note 244. 
265 Sboul Interview, supra note 248. 
266 Id. 
267 Malkawi, supra note 241. 
268 Sboul Interview, supra note 248. 
269 JAPM, http://www.japm.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
270 Sboul Interview, supra note248. 
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Five companies have either a European GMP or U.S. FDA 
approval.271 Pharma ex-chairman has stated that after data exclusivity, 
the local companies have upgraded their quality levels and they are now 
exporting their products to the European Union and United States.272 
The JAPM has replied to this point that the local companies have taken 
this step regardless data exclusivity.273 
The Jordanian pharmaceutical industry is considered to be a generic 
industry, one which does not involve innovation products. Few 
Jordanian companies have patents in this field, and the existing patents 
are mostly related to new techniques of old chemical entities, rather 
than to a new chemical entity. This lack of patents issued on the basis 
of innovation is due to insufficient financial resources for conducting 
the clinical trials that are required for new chemical entities, and also 
due to there being no foreign investment to support the local research 
and development or to strengthen the companies’ infrastructure.274 
Additionally, the local pharmaceutical industry faces many 
obstacles in their bid to export to countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, and Egypt; these countries tend to protect their own local 
industry.275 Additionally, as per the Secretary General of the JAPM, the 
enforcement of the data exclusivity approach has compounded the 
problem faced by Jordan’s pharmaceutical industry. Delaying the 
registration of the local generic product in Jordan, the country of origin, 
to around six years after the registration of the originator product 
consequently delays the generic product’s registration in export 
countries as well. Some countries request the marketing of the product 
in its country of origin for at least one year before submission of its 
registration file like Saudi Arabia. Additionally, other countries like 
Saudi Arabia price the generic products in descending order, so 
delaying the registration file submission will lead to a lower price, a 
price which might be untenable. Adding to this conundrum, a late 
market entry also has the effect of decreasing market share. 
Contrary to the situation in Jordan, the generic pharmaceutical 
industries of other countries like Israel and India have evolved to 
counter the effects of data exclusivity. These countries have set 
 
271 Ryan, supra note 244. 
272 Sutari Interview, supra note 245. 
273 Sboul Interview, supra note 248. 
274 Malpani, supra note 16. 
275 Malkawi, supra note 241. 
NSOUR (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2016  9:02 AM 
304 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 259 
legislation in such a way as to promote their generic industry.276 For 
example, Israel registers a generic product during the exclusivity period 
of the originator product for the purposes of export.277 
Beyond merely stymieing the growth of the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical industry, the constraints of the data exclusivity 
approach could have farther-reaching economic implications. 
Consequently, the decrease in pharmaceutical industry export will 
affect the Jordanian economy.278 
Some local pharmaceutical companies have found in merger and 
acquisitions the solution to withstand the competition and expand 
markets.279 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, data exclusivity provisions introduced in Jordan were 
not the best option for the country, as they have undermined people’s 
accessibility to affordable medicine and have had a  negative impact on 
the local pharmaceutical industry. As we have discussed throughout 
this paper, data exclusivity for NCEs is not mandatory under Article 
39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement and Article 4.22 of our FTA with the 
United States. The following measures are recommended to mitigate 
the negative impact of data exclusivity while still maintaining 
compliance with the obligations set in both Article 4.22 of the U.S.-
Jordan FTA and Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement. Many of these 
measures are already adopted in some countries without any adverse 
WTO ruling. To apply these measures, there must be amendments to 
the Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law and to the JFDA’s 
registration criteria. To establish a special regulation for granting data 
exclusivity, the following is needed: 
1. Shortening the term of data exclusivity for new chemical 
entities; neither TRIPs nor the U.S.-Jordan FTA mandates a five-year 
period. 
2. Start Date of Data Exclusivity: A country can consider that the 
start date for granting data exclusivity is the first registration of the 
product worldwide. 
 
276 Sboul Interview, supra note 248. 
277 Abughanm, supra note 208, at 339. 
278 Sboul Interview, supra note 248. 
279 Malkawi, supra note 241. 
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3. JFDA should examine the test data protection conditions before 
granting data exclusivity. Then, the JFDA can issue a protection 
certificate confirming the fulfillment of data exclusivity conditions: 
4. NCE and new uses definitions to be included in the registration 
criteria. Also, the eighteen-month period for which an applicant can 
register an NCE should also be applicable to new uses. 
5. Undisclosed test data: This term should be defined in the 
registration criteria and the JFDA should investigate this condition by 
requesting a certificate from the originator company declaring that the 
submitted test data have not been published in any capacity. If the data 
should later become nonconfidential, then the JFDA has the right to 
end the data’s exclusivity period. 
6. Considerable efforts: This term should be defined in the 
registration criteria and the JFDA should investigate this condition by 
requesting evidence from the originator company showing that the 
generation of the submitted test data involved considerable efforts, as 
demonstrated by the reported costs and by the duration of the period in 
which the the submitted test data was generated. 
7. Data exclusivity term should not extend beyond the patent term. 
8. Allow registration of the generic product for the purposes of 
export. 
9. Grounds for revocation of the data exclusivity period: such as 
anti-competitive practices of the originator company: high prices, delay 
in marketing the product more than six months from approval date, stop 
marketing for more than six months or insufficient marketing of the 
product. 
10. Waive data exclusivity protection in cases of compulsory 
licensing: in case of the issuance of a compulsory license, the generic 
company is still required to submit clinical trials. Therefore, data 
exclusivity should be waived in such cases. 
11. Waive data exclusivity in cases of emergency and public 
interest. 
12. Waive data exclusivity for products intended for the treatment 
of life threatening diseases. 
Applying all these measures to mitigate the negative effects of the 
data exclusivity approach in Jordan may raise many challenges and 
take time, but in our experience, some of these measures can be 
implemented with relative ease, especially those that do not require 
amending existing laws. The JFDA has the authority to apply some of 
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these measures, which may need only regulations amendments or 
create a new regulation to control data exclusivity granting. 
If these measures were to be applied or at least part of these 
measures, Jordan would minimize the effect of data exclusivity and 
promote access to medicine by providing a cheap generic product 
which is an equivalent product for the expensive originator product. 
In future negotiations of bilateral agreements, the governments 
should involve all concerned stakeholders to prevent any negative 
consequences. 
